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MANDATORY SETTLEMENTS IN CERCLA
ENFORCEMENT: FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM
BY REMOVING THE COURTS
BRIAN CARRICO*
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)1 in an attempt
to address the issue of hazardous waste disposal sites on a national level.
Congress recognized a dire need to create national standards to deal with
the increases in hazardous waste disposal created by massive growth in the
chemicals industry.2 Congress had considered a number of bills through-
out the late 1970s dealing with the hazardous waste issue, but all prior
measures had left the government powerless to act proactively regarding
these hazardous waste sites.3 While CERCLA represents a clear attempt
to address this shortcoming, it was considered and passed in the waning
days of an outgoing Congress, which created a sense of urgency in its pas-
sage.4 Because of the circumstances surrounding its passage, CERCLA was
a hastily written and enacted piece of legislation that left many questions
about its enforcement.5
Even after over thirty years of existence and a number of amend-
ments and re-enactments, courts are still not sure how to treat a wide array
of issues that come up over the course of a CERCLA response.6 CERCLA
* J.D. Candidate, William and Mary Law School, 2014; BS: Mathematics, BA: American
Studies, William and Mary, 2010.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
2 See Douglas M. Costle & Eckardt C. Beck, Attack on Hazardous Waste: Turning Back
the Toxic Tide, 9 CAP. U. L. REV. 425, 427, 432 (1980).
3 Robert C. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR
L. REV. 253, 256 (1981).
4 Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1982).
5 John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1997).
6 See Joanna M. Fuller, The Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA’s Volunteer
Remediators from Sidestepping the Settlement Bar, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 221–22
(2009).
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was enacted following the 1980 election by a lame duck Congress under
modified debate rules designed for quick and easy passage.7 The result
of this process was a poorly crafted law that “confounds every theory of
statutory interpretation”8 and that has left courts scrambling for over
three decades.
Funding has proven to be the root of many of the issues vexing the
courts as they try to strike an equitable balance within the structure of the
enacted legislation.9 “CERCLA’s imposition of strict, joint and several,
and retroactive liability without regard to causation”10 has led to extensive
criticism of the enforcement system as an “unforgiving regime” producing
“harsh result[s].”11 Some of the issues, which will be dealt with in depth
later in this Note, are orphan shares,12 contribution actions,13 and inter-
ference actions.14 The problems surrounding these issues complicate the
courts’ desire to reach equitable distributions in deciding CERCLA cases,
almost inevitably leaving one party or group of parties taking on a dispro-
portionately large portion of the cleanup costs compared to the relative
amount of waste they contributed to the site.15
One method that has been used to reach a more equitable distri-
bution of cleanup costs is to take the task of distributing the costs away
from the courts, instead having potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”)
join in settlement negotiations, reaching results that all of the PRPs in-
volved find tolerable.16 However, these settlements rarely, if ever, include
7 Grad, supra note 4, at 1.
8 Nagle, supra note 5, at 1410.
9 See id. at 1446.
10 Id.
11 United States v. Saporito, No. 07 C 3169, 2011 WL 2473332, at *13 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“The
court acknowledges that this is a harsh result, but CERCLA and the binding precedents
that interpret and apply the statute impose a relatively unforgiving regime on individuals
like Saporito found to be responsible parties.”); see also Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc.
v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging “seemingly harsh results”
but finding a balance of public interest in timely cleanup).
12 See generally Kenneth K. Kilbert, Neither Joint Nor Several: Orphan Shares and Private
CERCLA Actions, 41 ENVTL. L. 1045 (2011).
13 See generally William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The Relationship Between
CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 193 (1996).
14 See generally Fuller, supra note 6.
15 See Araiza, supra note 13, at 206–07.
16 See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relation-
ship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1139 (1994) (noting that
in settlements “an allocation formula accomplishes a form of ‘rough justice’ in which all
PRPs feel the result is unfair, but not unduly unfair”).
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all PRPs.17 In order to reach a more equitable solution, many commentators
have advocated measures aimed at bringing more PRPs to the table for
settlement negotiations in CERCLA enforcement,18 but these suggestions
merely shift balance of incentives to encourage settlement.19 One com-
mentator has gone as far as calling for a requirement that EPA notify all
PRPs and invite them to participate in a massive allocation process, but
still stops short of requiring all PRPs to participate.20 Experience has
shown that merely shifting the incentives is not enough to lead all PRPs
to choose settlement.21
Based on the failures of shifting incentives to bring all PRPs to the
table, this Note advocates for an entirely new system. This Note suggests
that EPA should be required to bring all PRPs into settlement negotiations
and appoint representation to participate on behalf of those who choose
not to participate. Such a system, if implemented properly with sufficient
safeguards, would largely, if not entirely, eliminate the need for contribu-
tion and interference actions and allow for a more equitable distribution
of cleanup costs than is available under the current system. While this sys-
tem would alleviate many of the problems with the current CERCLA en-
forcement mechanisms, it would introduce a number of new difficulties in
procedure and implementation. As such, the primary purpose of this Note
is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed system.
While there will be suggestions regarding how to deal with some of the
new issues posed, this Note does not attempt to precisely describe all of
the procedural details of the new system or detail the proper mechanisms
for its implementation.
Part I of this Note will provide background on the legislative
history of CERCLA. Part II will outline the current settlement proce-
dures. Parts III, IV, and V will discuss in depth the three major problems
in CERCLA enforcement mentioned earlier; Part III will discuss orphan
shares, Part IV will discuss contribution actions, and Part V will discuss
17 See id. at 1068–69 (outlining the factors that lead many PRPs to choose not to settle
with EPA).
18 See, e.g., id.; Matthew J. Lawlor, Comment, Super Settlements for Superfund: A New
Paradigm for Voluntary Settlement?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 123 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Organ, supra note 16, at 1064.
20 Martin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creating a Viable
Allocation Procedure for Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. REV. 59, 89 (1998).
21 See Organ, supra note 16, at 1139 (“Even if all PRPs were invited to participate in the
[settlement procedure], however, several factors would encourage some universe of PRPs
to refuse to participate.”).
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interferences. Part VI will explain the solution this Note proposes. Part VII
will discuss the potential problems with what this Note’s proposals.
I. CERCLA OVERVIEW
A. Background and Motivation
There were a number of factors pushing Congress to enact reform
measures, the most significant of which was a growth in the chemical in-
dustries, which made spills and other releases more common, as well as re-
search showing the harmful impacts of these releases.22 After looking into
the issue, Congress concluded that the hazardous waste disposal sites posed
a significant danger and that the laws in place were inadequate to address
the scope of the problem.23 Largely based on these findings, through the
late 1970s Congress began to pass hazardous waste acts aimed at both con-
tainment and cleanup.24
Congress was also motivated by a number of specific events, which
were documented in Committee Reports considering the proposed Super-
fund bills.25 These incidents included contamination of the James and
Hudson Rivers and studies of Michigan livestock.26 The largest single moti-
vation for new hazardous waste containment laws was likely a major di-
saster at Love Canal in upstate New York, which drove home the potential
human impact of hazardous waste disposal sites.27 Far more than the gen-
eral facts, these specific incidents underscored the need for a change in the
response mechanisms. In the words of one Congressman, “an occasional
disaster has more sex appeal than does the chronic disease.”28 Under the
law in place, EPA lacked “adequate authority to take preventative action,”29
and could only react to these disasters as they came up.
22 Grad, supra note 4, at 7.
23 Id. at 7–8.
24 See Costle & Beck, supra note 2, at 427–28 (discussing the need for hazardous waste
reform and the impact of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) of 1976).
25 Grad, supra note 4, at 7.
26 Id.
27 The Love Canal tragedy involved a chemical waste disposal site that was sold in 1953 to
facilitate a major housing development near Niagara Falls, New York. Eckardt C. Beck,
The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 EPA J. 17, 17 (1979). By the late 1970s the community was
seeing the chemicals seeping out of the ground, causing chemical burns and birth defects
as well as destroying any plant life in the area. Id. For a detailed description of the tragedy,
see id.
28 Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 263.
29 Id. at 256.
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Additionally, the 1980 election created a major shift in the composi-
tion of Congress, which many commentators cite as a factor in the late and
rushed Congressional action.30 After years of debating the policy, the Demo-
cratic majority Congress reacted quickly to the shift in power from the
1980 election.31 To some, the result of the 1980 election fully explains why
CERCLA was rushed and, in turn, why it still presents so many issues.32
B. Legislative History
The foundation of many of the current problems in CERCLA en-
forcement can be found in its legislative history.33 Because CERCLA was
rushed through Congress, the Act was not fully considered or thought-
fully enacted, “compromis[ing] depth for scope”34 and leaving many of the
largest issues to the courts, “unhelped by most of the tools traditionally
used in determining congressional intent.”35
Congress readily agreed on a number of issues, including the need
for regulation, and that, wherever possible, cleanup should be paid for by
the responsible parties.36 The main differences in the proposals involved
funding the cleanup when the responsible parties could not be held ac-
countable.37 The primary suggestions were payment from general govern-
ment revenue or coverage through an industry fee.38 As enacted, CERCLA
allows the government to draw from both resources to fund cleanups.39
While this was a contentious issue in the legislative history, the use of gov-
ernment funds to subsidize cleanup efforts is not an issue that comes up
often in practice, so it will not be discussed at length in this Note.40
30 Grad, supra note 4, at 7.
31 Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 264. Eckhardt, a Democratic member of the House until
1981, lamented the power of “a threat of filibuster at the threshold of entry of a Republican
Senate.” Id.
32 Nagle, supra note 5, at 1412.
33 This Note will cover only enough of the legislative history of CERCLA to provide neces-
sary background to understand why the Act passed in spite of its significant shortcomings.
For a full discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see generally Grad, supra note
4 and Eckhardt, supra note 3.
34 Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 253.
35 Nagle, supra note 5, at 1410.
36 Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 258–59.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 261.
40 Because of the broad reach of liability established in 42 U.S.C. § 9607, as long as EPA
can identify at least one responsible party the costs can be shifted from the government.
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Since CERCLA’s enactment, subsequent Congresses have attempted
to amend the statute, but have failed to resolve many of the issues left by
the drafters.41 The most significant amendment to CERCLA came only six
years after its enactment in the form of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”).42 SARA was not a complete over-
haul of the system, but it included a number of significant changes.43 The
most influential changes from SARA were increasing the Superfund trust,
putting an emphasis on permanent remedies and human health problems
in the cleanup process, adding settlement tools and enforcement authori-
ties, and encouraging state and local community involvement.44 The only
other significant statutory amendment to CERCLA is the Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, which primar-
ily reduced the legal and financial risks involved in redeveloping hazardous
waste sites.45 Throughout the 1990s, a number of interest groups pushed
Congress to reform the statute, but those efforts were consistently stalled
by partisan politics.46
C. Overall Effectiveness
Congress had two clear objectives in enacting CERCLA, which have
persisted through each effort at amendment: cleaning the hazardous waste
sites and ensuring that the costs of cleanup efforts are borne by those who
had benefitted from the disposal of hazardous waste.47 CERCLA does an
adequate job of addressing these concerns, but leaves too many questions
to consider those objectives fully met.48 In the words of one of the Congress-
men who passed the Act, “in attempting to cover them hastily in its waning
See also Press Release, Superfund: Setting the Record Straight, U.S. EPA (Oct. 1, 2003),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OPA/ADMPRESS.NSF/advs (search for “Superfund:
Setting the Record Straight” and click on “2003” box ) (“The majority of Superfund cleanups
are paid for by the person or group who bears responsibility for the cleanup.”).
41 Nagle, supra note 5, at 1410.
42 Id.
43  SARA Overview, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/sara.htm (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013).
44 Id.
45 Amy McMorrow, CERCLA Liability Redefined: An Analysis of the Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its Impact on State Voluntary
Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1087–89 (2004).
46 Ann R. Klee & Ernie Rosenberg, The Moribund State of CERCLA Reauthorization, 13
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 451, 451 (1999).
47 Eckhardt, supra note 3, at 253.
48 Id.
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days, Congress compromised depth for scope.”49 The amendments since
have done little to clarify the questions, with “politics of the extremes”50
preventing any significant changes.
As a result of the questions unanswered by CERCLA, the Act has
been a source of confusion for the courts as well as for the parties involved
in the cleanups. Jerome Organ effectively summarized the conflicting mes-
sages CERCLA conveys when he concluded that:
By affirming joint and several liability, Congress demon-
strated its desire to shift responsibility for remediation to
PRPs with little concern for fairness in the distribution of
liability among PRPs; by providing EPA with other settle-
ment tools, however, Congress demonstrated a distinct con-
cern for fairness in the distribution of liability . . . .51
Organ further explained that the availability of joint and several liabil-
ity against the PRPs discourages EPA from engaging in “the more time
consuming and resource-intensive efforts involved in engaging in equita-
ble allocations of liability.”52 As a result, CERCLA has in many ways fos-
tered litigation.53
This encouragement of litigation comes at a high cost. The vast
complications within CERCLA cause many judicial decisions to arrive at
an inequitable distribution of costs.54 Equity should be an essential aim
of CERCLA because the statutory framework establishing retroactive
liability means that often parties are held liable for actions that “were
entirely legal at the time they were undertaken.”55
The strict retroactive liability regime was a large point of contention
initially, so while a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief
analysis of the impact and justification will prove helpful.56 The largest crit-
icism of CERCLA was the unfair costs to businesses who were following
49 Id.
50 Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 451.
51 Organ, supra note 16, at 1053–54.
52 Id. at 1054.
53 Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 451.
54 A general discussion of the inequities created by judicial decisions, including the reasons
they occur, will occur later in this Note. See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
55 Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis,
20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 635 (1993).
56 See generally Bruce Howard, A New Justification for Retroactive Liability in CERCLA:
An Appreciation of the Synergy Between Common and Statutory Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
847 (1998) (analyzing the strict retroactive liability regime).
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all applicable legal standards.57 The strict liability regime was typically
justified as essential in order to ensure that the cleanup costs were as-
sumed by those who benefitted from the disposal.58 Additionally, at least
one Senate report concluded that the chemical industry had the capability
to internalize the costs of cleanup.59 Regardless of the industry’s ability to
cover the costs, the inherent inequity of CERCLA’s liability regime high-
lights the need for an equitable distribution of the costs, for which courts
have proven inadequate under the current regime.
II. CURRENT SETTLEMENT PROCESS
A. PRP Identification and Notification
Identifying PRPs is one of the more arduous tasks of CERCLA
enforcement. Generally, the Superfund sites have been idle for a long
period of time, so the search can become very involved.60 Once a PRP has
been identified, EPA notifies those parties through a general notice letter
(“GNL”) which alerts the party of their potential liability under CERCLA,
often with supporting information to justify the designation, and invites
the party to discuss or undertake a response at the site.61 EPA can also
use a special notice letter (“SNL”), which begins the enforcement process.62
After receiving an SNL, a PRP has 60 days to respond with a good faith
offer to conduct or finance remedial action at the site.63 EPA is free to bring
any number of parties into the negotiation or to reach agreements with
each party individually.64 Any PRP which does not to respond to the SNL
with a good faith offer will be liable to the government for cleanup costs
under CERCLA.65
57 Klee & Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 452.
58 See Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 77, 81 (1998) (explaining why a fault-based liability regime is inadequate in
hazardous material cases).
59 Grad, supra note 4, at 8.
60 A full discussion of the identification process is beyond the scope of this Note. For more
information on this process, see generally PRP Search Manual, U.S. EPA (2009), available
at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/prp-search-man-cmp-09b.pdf.
61 Id. at 34–35.
62 Id. at 35. The special notice letter is stipulated by 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e) which requires EPA
to notify parties prior to taking action under CERCLA and prevents EPA from taking action
under CERCLA until 120 days after providing notice to allow EPA and PRP to engage in
settlement discussions. The procedures described in § 9622 are optional but are typically
followed. Id. at 36.
63 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(2)(B) (2006).
64 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(2)(C) (2006).
65 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(4) (2006).
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B. Settlement Mechanisms
There are a number of mechanisms EPA can use to settle with
PRPs. One of the most simple is the de minimis settlement.66 Under a de
minimis settlement, a PRP who contributed comparatively little waste
in terms of volume or toxicity or an innocent landowner is able to reach
an expedited agreement with EPA.67 This mechanism is also available to
parties who can demonstrate “an inability or a limited ability to pay re-
sponse costs.”68
Once an agreement between EPA and a PRP or some group of
PRPs is reached, the terms of the agreement are formalized through one
of a number of different documents.69 The two primary mechanisms are
Administrative Orders on Consent (“AOCs”) and Judicial Consent Decrees
(“CDs”). EPA typically uses AOCs, which do not require court approval, to
finalize de minimis settlements.70 AOCs are only available to cover short-
term costs, such as removal activity and investigative work.71 Once in the
final cleanup phase, EPA must use a CD, which does require the approval
of a U.S. district court to finalize agreements.72
To enforce a CD or AOC, EPA can also issue a Unilateral Admin-
istrative Order (“UAO”) to any party that fails to comply with the agree-
ments.73 A UAO requires parties to undertake some response action under
threat of penalties up to three times the actual cost of cleanup, at the
66 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (2006).
67 Id. Regional offices of EPA determine what specific levels of contribution qualify a PRP
for de minimis designation. See Memorandum, Streamlined Approach for Settlements with
De Minimis Waste Contributors Under CERCLA Section 122(g)(1)(A), U.S. EPA (July 30,
1993), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/9100UDWT.TXT?ZyActionD=Zy
Document&Client=EPA&Index=1991+Thru+1994&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime
=&QfieldMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QField
Month=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A
\zyfiles\Index%20Data\91thru94\Txt\00000026\9100UDWT.txt&User=ANONYMOUS
&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h|-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0
&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=p|f&DefSeekPage=x&Search
Back=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1
&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL.
68 42 U.S.C. 9622(g)(7)(A) (2006).
69 Negotiating Superfund Settlements, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/negoti
ating-superfund-settlements (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Superfund Unilateral Orders, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/superfund
-unilateral-orders (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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discretion of a court.74 EPA can also issue these orders for sites where it
finds “that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment . . . .”75
C. Settlement Incentives
The strongest incentives to settle appear in the context of de mini-
mis settlements. The expedited agreement mechanism of de minimis settle-
ments is important for low level contributors, because under the standard
settlement procedure these parties would often face transaction costs
higher than the cost of their liability at the site.76 Allowing de minimis set-
tlements based on ability to pay allows a PRP to settle its liability in a way
that will avoid undue hardship but is typically reserved for PRPs who dem-
onstrate that paying their full share of the response costs “is likely to put
them out of business or jeopardize their viability.”77
Initially, EPA was reluctant to provide the same safeguards in-
cluded in standard CERCLA settlements to PRPs who settle as de minimis
contributors.78 In particular, EPA was hesitant to provide releases of lia-
bility or contribution protection for future costs at the site.79 However, the
use of de minimis settlements has been widely used and legislative changes
have allowed EPA to offer many of the same benefits, particularly the cove-
nant not to sue, but also requires the PRP to agree to waive claims against
other PRPs.80
Outside of the de minimis context, CERCLA provides EPA with a
number of tools that provide a strong incentive for PRPs to settle.81 These
incentives include a release from liability on the site both in the form of
protection against suits from other PRPs and covenants not to sue, under
which EPA agrees not to seek further damages provided the settling PRP
fulfills the agreement.82 CERCLA also provides incentives against rejecting
74 Id.
75 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006).
76 William W. Balcke, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments,
74 VA. L. REV. 123, 143 (1988).
77 PRP Search Manual, supra note 60, at 214.
78 Kathiann M. Kowalski, Why Can’t We Just Settle These Superfund Cases Once and For
All?, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 179, 189 (1985).
79 See id.
80 McMorrow, supra note 45, at 1098; 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(8)(A) (2006).
81 Incentives for Negotiating Superfund Settlements, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov
/enforcement/incentives-negotiating-superfund-settlements (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter U.S. EPA Incentives].
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(f)(1), (3) (2006).
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an offer to negotiate, primarily through the imposition of joint and several
liability.83 While CERCLA does encourage the courts to seek equitable
distributions,84 courts have nonetheless held that parties “seeking to avoid
joint and several liability bear the burden of proving that a reasonable
basis for apportionment exists.”85
D. Role of the Courts
As mentioned above, the way CERCLA was enacted left many sig-
nificant questions for the Court to decide.86 Leaving so many issues to the
courts to resolve has led to many splits in the lower courts.87 For many rea-
sons Congress had to leave many of these questions open in order to pass
CERCLA as a compromise act.88
The seemingly inherent judicial involvement in determining the
scope of CERCLA directly controverts the words of the Act, which gener-
ally restrict, and in some places outright reject, judicial review.89 According
to some scholars, the development of CERCLA common law was inevitable,
even encouraged by the legislative history.90 Others disagree, interpreting
the common law that developed around CERCLA as an unwanted but nec-
essary result of sloppy drafting.91 Regardless of congressional intent for
the development of a common law, CERCLA cases have come before the
courts in very high numbers.92 The next sections of this Note will address
83 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (establishing
that while CERCLA did not mandate joint and several liability, hazardous waste sites are
of the nature that multiple parties contribute to a single harm, and therefore common law
principles dictate that the burden of demonstrating divisibility is on the party seeking to
limit his liability).
84 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9613(f)(1) (2006). Section 9606 handles actions against PRPs on
behalf of the government, § 9613 handles actions between PRPs, both encourage the court
to consider the equities of the particular case, though § 9613 uses the permissive “may.” Id.
85 Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 (2009).
86 See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
87 See Nagle, supra note 5, at 1426.
88 James M. Strock, Settlement Policy Under the Superfund Amendments and Reautho-
rization Act of 1986, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 601 (1988). See also Nagle, supra note 5, at
1438–39.
89 42 U.S.C. 9622(a) (2006) (“A decision of the President to use or not to use the proce-
dures in this section is not subject to judicial review.”). See also Blake A. Watson, Liberal
Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts
Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 275–76 (1996).
90 Watson, supra note 89, at 292–93.
91 Nagle, supra note 5, at 1444–45.
92 See id. at 1444, 1446.
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the two most common mechanisms for CERCLA litigation, primarily ad-
dressing cases that arise among PRPs.
III. ORPHAN SHARES
A. What They Are and Why They Are a Problem
The root cause of many litigated CERCLA cases is what has come
to be referred to as the “orphan shares” of liability.93 These are the costs
associated with the contributions of parties who are defunct or otherwise
immune to judgment.94 Immunity to judgment includes only a few explic-
itly named defenses: act of God, act of war, and a limit to liability for third
party actions.95 Far more often, orphan shares are the result of parties be-
coming insolvent before the process of CERCLA enforcement begins.96
If complete equity were reached, CERCLA enforcement would leave
every party to pay for a portion of the cleanup costs equivalent to the pro-
portion of the hazardous waste they contributed to the site.97 However,
since the insolvency of some PRPs makes such a distribution impossible,
the orphan shares must be absorbed by someone. This requires either in-
creasing the burden on solvent PRPs or finding some other entity to pay,
which would likely be the taxpayers through the government. While orphan
shares present the largest complication in CERCLA enforcement, they
are also a natural by-product of the retroactive liability scheme.98
B. Orphan Shares Under the Current System
As CERCLA is currently enforced, the question of who should cover
orphan shares has typically been framed as a need to determine whether
settling PRPs or non-settling PRPs should be stuck with the burden.99 Both
perspectives are supported by strong justifications. Proponents of assign-
ing orphan shares to non-settling PRPs point to the incentive it provides
PRPs to settle.100 Arguments in favor of assigning the cost of orphan
93 Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1046.
94 Id. at 1047.
95 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006).
96 Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1046–47.
97 See Grad, supra note 4, at 17 (explaining that the main objection to instituting a strict
liability regime in CERCLA was the inequitable distribution of costs that would result).
98 Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1046–47.
99 Id. at 1047–48.
100 U.S. EPA Incentives, supra note 81 (“EPA’s orphan share compensation policy, however,
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shares to settling PRPs focus primarily on legal expedience and the fact
that any PRP can be held fully liable based on CERCLA’s joint and sev-
eral liability.101 Courts have ruled both ways, assigning the orphan shares
entirely to settling or to non-settling PRPs, often depending on how the
action was brought.102
While either result is within the constraints of CERCLA,103 assign-
ing orphan shares entirely to some subset of PRPs directly opposes the
typical result in cases involving joint tortfeasors.104 As a result, many com-
mentators have advocated, and some courts have used, an equitable system
of splitting the costs associated with the orphan shares.105 Though these
rulings are becoming more common, many courts still feel constrained by
the joint and several liability regimes in the CERCLA statute, which allows
recovery of the entire cost from a single defendant.106
IV. CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS
The typical mechanism for distributing the costs of cleanup, a con-
tribution action, arises when one PRP takes on the burden of the cleanup
operation, either financially or directly, and then seeks other reimburse-
ment from other PRPs.
allows EPA to not pursue some or all of the orphan share from parties that are willing
to sign a cleanup agreement.”); Organ, supra note 16, at 1096–97.
101 See Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 614 (2009)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. i (1963–1964)) (“When two or more
causes produce a single, indivisible harm, courts have refused to make an arbitrary appor-
tionment for its own sake.”); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
102 See infra Part IV.
103 In fact, the result may be required by the imposition of joint and several liability. See
Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1067–68.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. c (1979) (stating that when a joint tort-
feasor is insolvent or beyond their jurisdiction, “the court may be expected to do what is fair
and equitable under the circumstances.”).
105 See, e.g., Action Mfg. Co. v. Simon Wrecking Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 288, 328–29 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (stating that “it is equitable to allocate the orphan share proportionally between the
CSDG and the only remaining defendants,” the court elected “to allocate the entire [remain-
ing cleanup cost after other settlements] between the CSDG and the Simon Entities, in
proportion to their relative liability at the Site”); United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. 592,
601 (D.N.J. 1997) (“[t]here is no reason in law or equity to rule out the notion that consider-
ation may be given to equitable apportionment of the ‘orphan share’ among all responsible
parties”). See also Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1073 (discussing the adoption of a regime of
comparative responsibility which has been adopted by many states for tort claims, reflecting
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Apportionment of Liability § 17).
106 Kilbert, supra note 12, at 1058.
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A. A Demonstrative Case: Fox River
Approximately 270,000 people live along the Lower Fox River in
Wisconsin, which flows for about thirty-nine miles, starting at Lake Win-
nebago feeding into Green Bay and, ultimately, Lake Michigan.107 The
Fox River is also home to the world’s highest concentration of pulp and
paper mills.108 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, these mills used PCBs
to make a carbonless copy paper, a process which resulted in the discharge
of about 250,000 pounds of PCBs into the river.109 After conducting re-
search throughout the late 1990s, EPA issued a cleanup plan for the river
in 2002, dividing the river into five sections, or operable units.110 In April
of 2006, EPA reached a settlement agreement with two PRPs at the site,
NCR Corp. and Sonoco–U.S. Mills, Inc., under which the two corporations
agreed to spend an estimated $30 million in remedial costs.111
Five years later, NCR decided it had done its share of the cleanup
work and notified EPA that it would not continue.112 While admitting
liability under CERCLA, NCR argued that “it should not be responsible
for 100% of the remediation work.”113 By that point, at a cost of about
$50 million, NCR had participated in remedial efforts at three operable
units.114 In August of 2012, citing uncertainty in the case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction against NCR
to compel the corporation to continue the remedial efforts until a full trial
on the merits could be held.115 While NCR’s case is not over at this point,
the Seventh Circuit’s decision highlights the burden that can be placed
on parties who settle early and are forced to assume a large role in the
remedial effort.
107 Lower Fox River and Green Bay Site Background, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/Region5
/cleanup/foxriver/background.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
108 Id.
109 Id. PCBs, polychlorinated biphenyls, concentrate in an environment and cause health
hazards to an assortment of animals and ultimately humans. Id. At Fox River, the PCBs
have become part of the general sediment and have already contaminated Green Bay and
Lake Michigan. Id.
110 Fox River NRDA/PCB Releases, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region5/superfund/npl
/wisconsin/WI0001954841.html (last updated June 2013).
111 Press Release, Companies to Spend $30 Million on PCB Cleanup at the Lower Fox River
and Green Bay Superfund Site, Department of Justice (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/April/06_enrd_216.html.
112 United States v. NCR Corp., 688 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2012).
113 Id. at 836.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 844.
2013] MANDATORY SETTLEMENTS IN CERCLA ENFORCEMENT 265
B. Confusion of Legal Claims: The § 107/§ 113 Dichotomy116
Like at Fox River, contribution actions typically arise when one PRP
has provided or funded some cleanup efforts and attempts to recover some
costs from other parties.117 While CERCLA, as originally enacted, pro-
vided no literal right of action for contribution for PRPs who voluntarily
undertook some responsive cleanup action, the courts typically read a right
of action into the section defining the basis for private party liability.118
Attempting to fix the legislative hole, Congress created a private party
action through SARA in 1986.119 Initially, courts read these provisions to
establish “similar and somewhat overlapping remed[ies].”120
While this distinction is anything but clear, it is significant be-
cause of the way courts have interpreted the two sections. Under CERCLA
Section 107, courts have used a joint and several liability standard, mean-
ing any one defendant can be liable for the whole cost.121 Under CERCLA
Section 113, courts typically apply a more lenient several standard, which
allows courts to consider equitable factors to proportionally divide liability
among PRPs.122 Thus, a PRP can typically recover more from a defendant
in a contribution action under Section 107 than under Section 113, which
naturally makes § 107 a more appealing avenue for PRPs who have per-
formed voluntary cleanup.123
Largely because of the particularly harsh results of joint and several
liability under Section 107 claims, courts began to rule that CERCLA
Section 107 was unavailable to liable plaintiffs.124 Over the course of about
a decade each circuit came to this decision using a variety of arguments.125
116 This section of the Note will attempt to provide a concise overview of a very confusing
topic. For articles discussing these issues in more detail, see Steven Ferrey, Inverting the
Law: Superfund Hazardous Substance Liability and Supreme Court Reversal of All Federal
Circuits, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 648 (2009) and see generally Araiza,
supra note 13.
117 Araiza, supra note 13, at 194.
118 Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Nat’l Contingency
Plan, 40 C.F.R. 300.1–300.81 (1982)) (“District Court decisions have been virtually unani-
mous in holding that section 9607(a)(4)(B) creates a private right of action against section
9607(a) responsible parties for the recovery of ‘necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the National Contingency Plan.’ ”).
119 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1) (2006).
120 Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
121 Ferrey, supra note 116, at 648.
122 Id. at 650.
123 See id. at 663.
124 Id. at 663–64.
125 Id. at 664–66.
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In doing so, the courts effectively turned PRPs’ Section 107 claims into Sec-
tion 113 claims in order to use the more equitable distribution standard.126
Despite the uniformity across the Circuit Courts that private party
claims were properly heard under Section 113 not Section 107,127 the
Supreme Court in 2004 concluded that CERCLA Section 113 is unavail-
able to “a private party who has not been sued under CERCLA § 106 or
§ 107(a).”128 The result of these rulings was that every Circuit barred Sec-
tion 107 claims from PRPs and the Supreme Court barred Section 113
claims, leaving PRPs with no avenue to seek contribution for volunteer
cleanup, creating a huge disincentive for the volunteer remediation on
which the existing system relies.129 To avoid entirely foreclosing the avail-
ability of contribution actions, the Supreme Court then confirmed the
availability of Section 107 to private parties.130 The result of these cases
has been vast confusion in the area of contribution claims, which generally
discourages voluntary remediation.131
V. NON-SETTLING PRP INTERFERENCE
Another mechanism PRPs have used to ensure equitable distribu-
tions is filing interference actions when EPA files a settlement agreement
with a subset of the PRPs at a site.
A. A Demonstrative Case: San Gabriel Valley
In 1979, EPA discovered groundwater contamination in the San
Gabriel Basin aquifer and five years later added the basin to the National
Priorities List, the first step in initiating cleanup efforts under CERCLA.132
EPA, along with the California Department of Health Services, assessed
the extent of the contamination through a well sampling program that
showed extremely high levels of volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”).133
126 See, e.g., Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Whatever
label Akzo may wish to use, its claim remains one by and between jointly and severally
liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been compelled
to make. Akzo’s suit accordingly is governed by section 113(f).”).
127 Ferrey, supra note 116, at 662.
128 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 160–61 (2004).
129 Ferrey, supra note 116, at 675–76.
130 United States v. Atlantic Research Corp, 551 U.S. 128, 128 (2007).
131 Ferrey, supra note 116, at 684.
132 United States v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010).
133 Superfund Site Overview San Gabriel Valley, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region9
/SanGabriel (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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Cleanup at this site is ongoing, but the aquifer still provides about 90% of
the Valley’s drinking water.134 The site was included on the NPL as four
sites comprising six regions of groundwater contamination.135 The efforts
at funding cleanup in the South El Monte region of Area 1, which has in-
cluded extensive litigation,136 is illustrative of the problems surrounding
interference actions.
While EPA has conducted research and cleanup operations through-
out the San Gabriel Valley since the early 1980s, the cleanup of the South
El Monte Operable Unite (“SEMOU”) began in earnest in the mid-1990s.137
In 2000, EPA proposed a thirty-year cleanup and containment plan for the
region.138 In 2002, EPA sent SNLs to sixty-seven PRPs it had identified and
began negotiating with a group of PRPs.139 Shortly thereafter, EPA reached
a settlement with a subset of that group of PRPs, referred to as the Group
of 13, under which the Group of 13 would pay $4.7 million to cleanup the
VOCs at the SEMOU.140 In 2005, EPA detected another chemical, per-
chlorate, in the water, which increased the estimated cleanup costs by an
estimated $46 million.141 Following this discovery, the settling PRPs agreed
to provide an additional $3.4 million to account for the increased cost,
which was confirmed in a CD through the Central District of California.142
A group of the remaining PRPs moved to intervene in the settlement “to
protect their rights to contribution under CERCLA, and to ensure that the
consent decree embodies a fair and reasonable allocation of liability.”143
Their motion was eventually granted by the Ninth Circuit.144
134 U.S. EPA, Progress Report on San Gabriel Valley Ground Water Cleanup 1, 1 (Dec.
2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/84e3d3f748094337882
5723300794f02/0065ed704ae95ccc88257007005e941e/$FILE/Final%20SGV_VC.pdf. It is
important to note that all water is treated to meet federal and state standards before it is
supplied for drinking. Id. at 6.
135 Id. at 1. The Valley is listed as San Gabriel Valley Areas 1 to 4 and Area 1 is further sub-
divided into three regions. Id.
136 See Richard M. Frank, The Ninth Circuit Issues Major Superfund Decision, BERKELEY
LAW (June 24, 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8744.htm.
137 San Gabriel Valley (area 1) El Monte, South El Monte, Whittier Narrows, U.S. EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/region9/SanGabrielElMonte (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
138 United States v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1146–47.
142 Id. at 1147.
143 Id. at 1149.
144 Aerojet, 606 F.3d at 1153.
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B. Considerations of Intervention in CERCLA
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party has a right to
intervention if it has an interest so tied to the issue contested that dispos-
ing of the action without its representation would harm its ability to protect
its interest.145 The question of this provision’s applicability to CERCLA
litigation has emerged as a significant issue of debate among scholars and
a split in the circuits.146
Much of the criticism of allowing interferences in CERCLA focuses
on the complications it introduces to litigation and the interest in finality
of settlements.147 One court went as far as to say “that allowing interven-
tion . . . would only frustrate CERCLA policy and, in effect, eliminate
CERCLA’s statutory incentive for settlement.”148 Courts have a general
preference for settlements for a variety of reasons, which creates a strong
incentive for denying interference actions.149 Additionally, the nature of
CERCLA cases creates an added incentive in that early settlement provides
funding for cleanup operations more quickly than extensive court cases.150
Some courts have also taken a more legalistic approach, arguing that a non-
settling PRP’s interest is not direct enough to justify intervention.151
The Ninth Circuit’s Aerojet decision counters many of these points
and provides reasoning for affirming the interests of non-settling PRPs
by allowing intervention. In that case, the court was strongly persuaded
by CERCLA Section 113’s protection of settling PRPs against contribution
claims from other PRPs.152 This protection is necessary to the finality of
145 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
146 Compare Aerojet, 606 F.3d at 1152 (finding that the immunity given to settling PRPs
makes consideration of the interests of non-settling PRPs essential for finality of the
case), and United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8th Cir. 1995) (observing
that Rule 24 is to be construed liberally, resolving all doubts in favor of the intervening
party), with United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1184 (3d Cir. 1994)
(finding that the interest of a non-settling PRP is contingent on some future action be-
tween the government and the attempted intervener and therefore is insufficient to justify
an interference).
147 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 136. See also United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603,
607 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (“Under CERCLA, that interest is expressly subordinated by the
desire for the early de minimis settlements and the finality of judgments obtained through
the settlements.”).
148 Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 141, 146 (D. Ariz. 1991).
149 Fuller, supra note 6, at 246.
150 Id. at 247.
151 See Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1183–84; Toby A. McCartt, Intervention by Non-Settling
PRPs in CERCLA Actions, 41 ENVTL. L. 957, 982–83 (2011).
152 United States v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). See also 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006) (“A person who has resolved its liability to the United States
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a CERCLA settlement, which in turn is essential to encouraging settle-
ments.153 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the non-settling PRPs
ultimately agreed liability would be determined by the agreement between
the government and the settling PRPs, the non-settling PRPs have a suf-
ficient interest to maintain an interference action.154 The Court disagreed
with the argument that the non-settling PRPs’ interest under Section 113
based on their ultimate settlement was only contingent or speculative.155
The court also acknowledged that the interests of the parties involved in
a CERCLA settlement are “directly opposed to those of the [non-settling
PRPs]” and, as such, the interests of the non-settling PRPs are not taken
into account at all.156
VI. PROPOSED NEW SETTLEMENT PROCESS
A. Overview and Mechanics of the Proposed Settlement
The general idea this Note proposes is a simple one: EPA should
be required to bring all PRPs to the same table for negotiations prior to
reaching a settlement on a Superfund site. Ideally this would result in
EPA reaching a single settlement with all PRPs regarding the distribution
of all current and future cleanup costs. Such a system would promote a
much greater level of equity in the cost distribution and decrease court and
other transactional costs.
Under this system, the initial PRP identification steps would re-
main largely the same. EPA would be required to identify the PRPs at a
site and send out notice letters, as is already done.157 In the notice letters,
EPA would invite notified PRPs to identify other PRPs at the site, which
is also already done.158 However, instead of an invitation to participate in
negotiations or a notification of judicial action, the notice letters would pro-
vide the PRPs with a timeline of the settlement discussions and instruc-
tions regarding who will negotiate on their behalf should they fail to timely
or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”).
153 Fuller, supra note 6, at 244–45.
154 Aerojet, 606 F.3d at 1150. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (“Such settlement does not
discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it
reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement.”).
155 Aerojet, 606 F.3d at 1150. The Court pointed out that CERCLA § 113(f)(1) “provides
an interest in such a claim to any ‘liable or potentially liable’ person.” Id.
156 Id. at 1153.
157 PRP Search Manual, supra note 60, at 33.
158 Id. at 52.
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respond. Once a critical mass of the parties is notified, all parties will be
brought together for a single negotiation.
B. De Minimis Settlement in the Proposed System
The system proposed by this Note would require much heavier and
earlier use of de minimis settlements for two significant reasons. First,
they would create an early fund which could be used for initial cleanup or
administrative work while the larger PRPs worked on settling the distribu-
tion of the rest of the costs.159 Second, early de minimis settlements would
limit the number of parties involved in the mass negotiation, which would
allow that process to proceed more quickly.160 In order to make de minimis
settlements more effective in accomplishing these goals, the new system
should relax the requirements for a PRP to qualify for de minimis status.161
The specific levels that should be required are difficult to determine, but
ideally de minimis settlements should allow most PRPs to cash out with
minimal extraneous expenses.
C. Settlement Preference in the Current System
An emphasis on settlement rather than litigation is certainly not
a new idea; the preference for settlement is even encompassed in the Act
itself.162 A recent report from the United States Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) found that roughly eighty percent of all CERCLA enforce-
ments from 1979 through 2007 were consensual, meaning they were the
result of a successful settlement.163 Further, over sixty percent of negotia-
tions were concluded with administrative action, rather than judicial, keep-
ing the courts out of the settlement entirely.164 Clearly the all-inclusive
negotiation advocated by this Note could occur under the current system,
159 Jennifer Martin, Comment, A Prescription to Expedite Hazardous Waste Cleanups: De
Miminis Settlements and ADR, 21 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 361, 369 (1991).
160 Id. at 367 (noting that negotiations become easier among the major contributors once
the de minimis parties have cashed out).
161 Id. at 370–71.
162 “Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the
President shall act to facilitate agreements under this section . . . in order to expedite
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (2006).
163 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-656, SUPERFUND LITIGATION HAS DE-
CREASED AND EPA NEEDS BETTER INFORMATION ON SITE CLEANUP AND COST ISSUES TO
ESTIMATE FUTURE PROGRAM FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 24 (2009).
164 Id.
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but thirty years of experience has demonstrated that such a system will
not arise organically.
While settlements have a large prominence in CERCLA enforce-
ments, each settlement typically only includes some of the PRPs at any par-
ticular site, which leads to multiple enforcement actions at a single site.165
The previously mentioned GAO report noted a median of three enforce-
ment actions across Superfund sites, with one site requiring sixty-eight
separate enforcement actions.166 Such a system, combined with CERCLA’s
liability scheme, places later settling parties in a more difficult position
once others have already settled.167 For these reasons, an equitable distri-
bution can only be reached when all PRPs are brought to the table together.
D. Super Settlements
Over the last decade and a half, Super Settlements or environmen-
tal liability transfers (“ELTs”) have emerged as a new system to consolidate
cleanup efforts.168 In these systems, a single entity contracts with PRPs to
assume their liability and perform cleanup at a site.169 This system creates
many benefits, including an earlier conclusion of CERCLA enforcements
as PRPs ‘cash out,’ which allows remedial work to begin sooner.170 ELTs
also ease the difficulties of transferring contaminated property, thus facili-
tating redevelopment of Superfund sites.171
ELTs do have some drawbacks. The use of a third party insurer
removes a large degree of oversight and control from the government.172
Instead of allowing EPA to direct the settlement, a private company takes
165 Id. at 23.
166 Id.
167 Courts have noted in the context of interferences that because of the joint and several
liability imposed by CERCLA, once EPA has entered into a settlement with some group of
PRPs the remaining liability of other PRPs is directly impacted. See United States v. Aerojet
Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Because of this, if a group of PRPs settles
for less than their proportional share, or even exactly their proportional share, then EPA
will not accept a settlement agreement with the remaining PRPs for less than the remain-
ing cost of remediation, even if, because of a favorable settlement for the early settlers or
the orphan shares, that share is disproportionate to the remaining PRPs’ activity at the site.
168 See Kristin L. Hines, Examining Contractual Models for Transferring Environmental
Liability: How They Work and Where They Are Headed, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 418 (2009).
169 Kenneth F. Gray, “Super Settlements”: Early Release for All PRPs at Multiparty Super-
fund Sites?, 12 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 298, 298 (1998).
170 Id. at 299.
171 Hines, supra note 168, at 399.
172 Id. at 416.
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on the responsibility of estimating the cleanup costs and assigning the
relative liability of individual PRPs.173 Additionally, the for-profit nature
of the cleanup companies requires a relatively high baseline cost in order
to provide the third party company with enough potential reward to justify
the risk of taking on liability for the site, so ELTs are not as effective for
small, low cost sites.174
VII. ISSUES WITH THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
The proposal of mandatory settlement with appointed representa-
tion appears to be a novel one across all areas of regulatory law. Naturally,
this means that there will be novel issues created by the process. The in-
tent in this Part is not to provide definitive answers to all of the possible
problems with the proposed system, but to explore some of the system’s
obvious drawbacks and suggest some ways to deal with them.
A. Mechanics of Appointing Representation for Absent PRPs
Settling the mechanics of the appointed representation is likely to
be the most contentious issue in implementing the proposed system. The
businesses involved will need reassurances that should they choose not to
participate they will still receive adequate representation. The most ob-
vious difficulties are deciding how to fund the appointed representatives
for the absent PRPs and who to appoint. The first issue is dealt with fairly
easily by passing the costs on to the PRPs that require appointed repre-
sentatives as part of the cost ultimately demanded of them at the end of
the negotiation. Deciding who to appoint poses a much greater challenge.
There are two categorical approaches to determining who to ap-
point to represent absent PRPs: (1) establish a group within EPA to rep-
resent absent PRPs; or (2) bring in independent counsel, likely from a
pre-approved list. In weighing the two options a number of factors come
into play, primarily the associated costs and the ability to maintain the
proper bias. In regards to both factors, independent counsel seems to be
the preferred option.
In terms of associated costs, internal representation will either draw
resources away from other areas of EPA work or create a department which
will see an unpredictable workload. Conversely, using outside groups would
allow EPA to take bids from outside counsel to find a low cost option for
173 Id. at 405.
174 Id. at 406.
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representing the absent PRPs. These groups would likely be firms with
experience representing PRPs in CERCLA cases who do not have a client
in the particular site at issue.
Regarding bias, perceived bias is just as important as actual bias.
Ideally, the appointed representatives should look and act just as they
would if hired directly by the PRP whom they represent. With that in mind,
the perception would likely be that a group within EPA is more likely to
simply favor a quick resolution, which could lead to a suspicion that the
appointed representatives are taking on more costs than they should. An
independent representative would be more likely to act the same as out-
side counsel hired by the PRP itself, or at least would be more likely to be
viewed in that light.
B. Respecting the Finality of the Settlement
There will be some circumstances in which the absent PRP should
not be held responsible for the portion of the total costs that their appointed
representative accepted on their behalf. However, there is a critical concern
in preserving the finality of the settlement for the other PRPs involved.175
This finality would be completely undermined if an absent PRP were al-
lowed to object to the final agreement. Therefore, the proposed system
should preserve the current protection from contribution for PRPs who
participate against absent PRPs.176 Tracking current law, the agreement
should be final as to the liability of the present PRPs with the share as-
signed to the absent PRPs to be paid by the absent PRP or, if an absent
PRP can demonstrate good reason, to the appointed representative of EPA.
C. When to Shift Liability to the Appointed Representative
Situations may arise in which an absent PRP’s appointed repre-
sentative reaches an agreement that is plainly unfair to the absent PRP.
While the new system could be designed to force absent PRPs to honor the
agreement made without them,177 because the proposed system is pri-
marily motivated by equity concerns, rather than punishing the absent
175 Fuller, supra note 6, at 248 (“Private parties benefit from both the certainty of entering
into a negotiated settlement and the finality of settlement.”).
176 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006).
177 The joint and several liability standard already a part of CERCLA allows EPA to hold an
absent PRP responsible for any amount up to the entire cost of cleanup. See United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810–11 (S.D. Ohio 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
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PRPs, there should be a systematic safeguard to protect absent PRPs from
plainly unfair agreements. Such an unfair settlement could come from a
number of causes. Because the appointed representatives are not actually
hired by the party who will ultimately pay the settlement, there may not
be a sufficient level of natural accountability. While the system would
work best if the absent PRPs were held to the agreement made by their
appointed representative,178 the appointed representative should not be
allowed to act in bad faith or against the interests of the PRP they repre-
sent and escape liability. In order to address that need, there should be a
mechanism in place to ensure that the appointed representatives have suf-
ficient accountability to the PRP whom they are appointed to represent.
The easiest way to ensure that level of accountability would be to
create a cause of action for absent PRPs against their appointed repre-
sentatives. In order to keep these actions from getting out of hand, this
Note suggests establishing a gross negligence standard for actions by PRPs
against their appointed representative. Under such a standard, appointed
representatives would only be held liable if the PRP could demonstrate
that they failed to perform more than cursory research, that they relied
entirely on the research of other PRPs at the site, or that they negotiated
in bad faith. The PRP would not be successful in a suit merely because
they would have acted differently in the negotiation or because they are
dissatisfied with the result.
Additionally, the appointed representative should be encouraged
to reach out to the PRP for any information the PRP has that would be
helpful. In order to encourage such interaction, the appointed represen-
tative should be granted an affirmative defense to any suit from the PRP
based on the PRP’s failure to respond to routine inquiries. In addition to
bringing the most and best information into the negotiation, such a policy
would provide the absent PRPs with an avenue to have some impact on
the negotiation.
D. When to Shift Liability to EPA
An absent PRP should be able to shift liability to EPA any time
it can demonstrate that the process as a whole was inherently unfair and
led to an unfair agreement. The most obvious scenario in which the pro-
cess is inherently unfair occurs when EPA fails to properly notify the PRP
of the enforcement process. In such situations, the same equity concerns
178 Such a requirement would increase the likelihood that PRPs would choose to participate
themselves in order to have some control over how much they owe for the cleanup.
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which motivate this system would be undermined by enforcing a settle-
ment against a party who had no proper notice regarding their liability at
the site.
Demonstrating an unfair agreement should require that the PRP
demonstrate that the agreement assigns them a significantly larger portion
of the costs than a similarly situated present PRP. Because of the orphan
share problem, demonstrating that the costs assigned were disproportion-
ate with their contribution would not be enough to demonstrate an unfair
agreement. If the courts determine that despite the systematic unfairness
the agreement was nonetheless fair, the case should be dismissed as harm-
less error and the PRP would still be held liable for the negotiated amount.
In cases in which the PRP can demonstrate both an unfair process
and an unfair agreement, their liability should be reduced to that portion
of the costs which the courts find equitable. This amount will be deter-
mined when the court determines that the agreement was unfair based
on the similarly situated present PRP and EPA should be forced to absorb
the difference.
E. PRPs Seeking to Join Negotiations in Progress
Another difficulty which would naturally arise are PRPs seeking
to insert themselves into the negotiation after the process has started. This
could arise in one of two ways: (1) a PRP is only identified late in the pro-
cess; or (2) an absent PRP seeks to replace their appointed representative.
The first scenario is most likely to arise with a PRP who qualifies for a de
minimis settlement, which can be handled quickly outside of the main
negotiation. If the late identified PRP does not qualify for a de minimis
settlement, they should be invited to join the negotiation. While this may
upset portions of the negotiation, inclusion of new PRPs will necessarily
decrease the burden on all of the PRPs already at the table, so objections
should be minimal.
The second scenario poses a much larger challenge. While an in-
terest in an inclusive negotiation process would weigh in favor of allow-
ing PRPs to join in at any point, the interests of the other PRPs require
some limit on late-joining parties. The entire process is delayed when a
party joins the negotiation after it has already begun and any intermediate
agreements that had already been made are brought into question. The
easiest way to deal with this issue is through encouraging, or potentially
requiring, the appointed representative to attempt to maintain contact
with the PRP. This would allow the PRP to enter the negotiation at any
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time through their appointed representatives while causing only minimal
disruptions to the negotiation process.
CONCLUSION
Almost twenty years ago, one commentator argued “that for the
Superfund program to work efficiently . . . all PRPs must be invited to par-
ticipate in [settlement talks] and all PRPs must view the decision to par-
ticipate in [settlement talks] as their reasonable least-cost option.”179 None
of the changes in CERCLA enforcement have accomplished that goal, which
is why this Note advocates removing the option of non-participation in set-
tlement talks. Clearly there would still be some sites where settlements
would fall through, leaving the courts to decide the equitable distribution.
However, the proposed system would lead to many more Superfund sites
seeing settlements among all of the PRPs, completely avoiding the judicial
system. In the process, this will reduce court costs and direct more of the
funds to cleanup and return the primary role of enforcement to EPA.
179 Organ, supra note 16, at 1140.
